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Criminal Procedure-FAIR TRIAL-CONSTITUTION DOES NOT GRANT
AN AFFIRMATIVE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO A PRETRIAL PROCEEDING WHEN
ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREE IT SHOULD BE CLOSED To PROTECT
DEFENDANT'S FAIR TRIAL RIGHTS-Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.
Ct. 2898 (1979).
The summer of 1979 saw the closing of twenty-two criminal trials
in twelve states'-an unprecedented exercise of judicial discretion.
Yet those actions were arguably sanctioned by the United States
Supreme Court in its July Gannett Co. v. DePasquale opinion.'
Although Chief Justice Burger publicly has denied that the Court
intended its decision to go beyond the closing of pretrial suppression
hearings, 3 lower courts have cited DePasquale as precedent for their
closure rulings.
The genesis of this controversial decision was an upstate New
York murder case in which the defense successfully moved to close
a pretrial suppression hearing because of the "unabated buildup of
adverse publicity."' Long-time Seneca County, New York, resident
Wayne Clapp allegedly was shot and killed with his own gun by
David Jones and Kyle Greathouse. 5 Arrested in Michigan, the two
fugitives confessed to the murder and turned over the weapon to
Michigan police before being extradited to New York.' Back in Se-
neca County, however, the defendants pleaded not guilty and re-
quested that their prior statements, and the gun, be suppressed as
evidence.7 The district attorney did not oppose the defense motion
to close the suppression hearing to the press and public.' But once
the trial court granted the defense motion, Gannett Co., Inc., the
nation's largest newspaper chain and owner of two Rochester, New
York, newspapers, moved to vacate the closure order.' The trial
1. Epstein, Closing of trials traced to Supreme Court Ruling, Tallahassee Democrat, Aug.
19, 1979, at 8A, col. 2. In an explicit attempt to clarify DePasquale, the United States
Supreme Court has agreed to review Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 5 MFDIA L. REP. 1545,
cert. granted, No. 79-243 (Oct. 9, 1979), in which the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the right
of a circuit court judge to close a criminal trial to both the press and the public.
2. 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
3. TIME, Aug. 20, 1979, at 49. "Burger blamed the press for misleading lower court judges
on the scope of the high court's decision." Id.
4. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898
(1979).
5. MacKenzie, Closed Courtrooms?, 65 A.B.A.J. 53 (1979). Clapp disappeared after local
residents saw him in his fishing boat on Seneca Lake in the company of two young strangers.
The victim's body has never been recovered. Id.
6. Id. at 54.
7. TiME, July 16, 1979, at 66.
8. 99 S. Ct. at 2903.
9. Id. at 2899. A reporter for the Rochester newspapers was present at the hearing but did
not object to the closure order until after she had consulted with Gannett's counsel. Judge
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court refused to grant Gannett's motion, reasoning that publicity of
the pretrial suppression hearing would be prejudicial to the de-
fendants. 0
Upon a request for prohibition and mandamus, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that Judge DePasquale's
order was not supported by a sufficient showing of potential preju-
dice and that it thus violated petitioner's first amendment rights."
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, however, asserting that
"the Constitution should not be considered as a substitute for a
sunshine law.' 2
On July 2, 1979, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, af-
firmed the court of appeals' ruling. 3 The Court held that "the
constitutional guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the
defendant" alone," and that the public has no "correlative right
* . . to insist upon a public trial.' 5 Justice Stewart recognized that
open proceedings were an important concept at common law, but
he rejected the contention that a public right of access had been
incorporated into the sixth amendment. While recognizing the ex-
istence of a "strong societal interest" in open criminal trials, Justice
Stewart nevertheless found that the public had no "affirmative
DePasquale granted counsel's request for a hearing, even though the two-day suppression
hearing had ended. Id.
10. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), modified,
372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd., 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). Contra, Brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae In Support of the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16 (the ACLU concluded that a change of venue would
have protected defendants' fair trial rights because, as far as it had been able to determine,
neither Clapp's murder nor the arrest of Jones and Greathouse had been reported in the New
York Times).
11. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 723-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976),
modified, 372 N.E.2d 544 (N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). The defendants' trials were
pending at the time of the appellate division's ruling. 372 N.E.2d at 547.
12. 372 N.E.2d at 548. "[The inherent power to limit public access has become a com-
mon and integral aspect of due process in trials for particularly sensitive crimes. . . . Having
imposed on the Trial Judge an affirmative obligation to ensure this [public access-fair
trial] balance, it would be anomalous indeed to withhold the discretionary power necessary
to achieve it." Id. (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) The New York Court of Appeals
reviewed the case even though the questions presented had been rendered moot when the
defendants pleaded guilty to lesser included offenses. Id. at 547.
13. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (U.S. 1979). Justice Stewart was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens; Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Rehnquist filed concurring opinions.
14. Id. at 2906. "The Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial
on the part of the public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the
accused." Id. at 2905. Justice Stewart relied heavily on law review notes and articles to
substantiate this conclusion. Id. at 2906 n.9. Ironically, Justice Stewart wrote in his dissent
in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 614-15 (1965): "The suggestion that there are limits upon
the public's right to know what goes on in courts causes me deep concern."
15. 99 S. Ct. at 2906.
16. Id. at 2907.
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[constitutional] right of access" because "our adversary system of
criminal justice is premised upon the proposition that the public
interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation.""
The Court declined to decide whether a first amendment right of
access exists.'8 It pointed out that Judge DePasquale's closure order
was temporary, not absolute, and that petitioner eventually gained
access to the transcript of the hearing at issue.'"
Even though the Court was careful to make a distinction between
pretrial proceedings and the criminal trial itself in the text of its
opinion, 20 its actual holding reads: "[M]embers of the public have
no constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to attend criminal trials.""
In a lengthy and well-documented dissent,1 Justice Blackmun
chastised the Court for its "easy but wooden approach," and for
its failure to recognize the modern-day significance of pretrial hear-
ings.24 He forcefully suggested that the Court's failure to recognize
a constitutional right of public access to criminal trials presents the
possibility of summary closure of all judicial proceedings, so long as
both judge and litigants agree.2 Such a result, he asserted, would
be contrary to the practices of Anglo-American common law28 and
17. Id. at 2907-08, 2913.
18. "We need not decide in the abstract . . . whether there is any such constitutional
right. For even assuming . . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments may guarantee
such access. . . this putative right was given all appropriate deference by the State nisi prius
court in the present case." Id. at 2912.
19. Id. The transcript was made available after the two defendants pleaded guilty to lesser
offenses. Id. at 2904 n.4.
20. Id. at 2909-10.
21. Id. at 2911 (emphasis added).
22. 99 S. Ct. at 2919. Joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, Justice Blackmun
concurred with the Court's finding that the controversy was not moot, but dissented from the
rest of the opinion. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Justice Blackmun compared criminal trials at early common law and at the time
of the drafting of the Constitution with modern-day pretrial hearings by pointing out that in
1976, 100% of felony prosecutions in Seneca County, New York, terminated at the pretrial
stage. Id. at 2934. New York City disposed of 89.7% of its 17,700 felony indictments that year
at pretrial hearings. In New York State (excluding New York City and Seneca County), 93.4%
of the 16,676 felonies prosecuted in 1976 were resolved before coming to full trial. Brief for
Petitioner at 10 n.6 (quoting State of New York, Twenty-Second Annual Report of the Judi-
cial Conference 52-55 (1977)).
Justice Stewart, on the other hand, equated present-day suppression hearings with formal-
ized preliminary proceedings at common law, taking no note of the increased reliance on
pretrial hearings for final adjudication. 99 S. Ct. at 2909 n.17. But see id. at 2913-14 (Burger,
C.J., concurring); 2914 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 2907. The Court rejected the notion that an accused can compel a private trial
without the concurrence of the prosecutor and the trial court. Id. at n.11. See Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 2925-26; see 2 BISHoP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 957 (2d ed. 1913).
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to the spirit in which the sixth amendment was drafted. 7 Justice
Blackmun further pointed out that the Court's holding is inconsist-
ent with the open court practices of many states.18 That particular
concern suggests that the DePasquale opinion may well endanger
one of the most progressive state responses to the public's right of
access- Florida's bold new "cameras in the courtroom" experi-
ment.2
The Florida Supreme Court allowed the temporary use of televi-
sion cameras in the courtroom in 1975 when Post-Newsweek Sta-
tions, Florida, Inc., filed a petition to change the Florida Bar's judi-
cial code of conduct.M The project failed initially, but on July 1,
1977, the Florida Supreme Court approved a one-year pilot program
to permit electronic media coverage of court proceedings at all lev-
els. 31 By the end of that program, more than 2,750 judges, attorneys,
jurors, witnesses, and court personnel had participated in televised
proceedings .32
Two surveys resulted from the pilot program. The first dealt with
nonjudicial participants and was conducted by the Office of the
State Courts Administrator (OSCA).3 Sixty-two percent of those
contacted responded to the questionnaires, and their favorable com-
ments helped convince an already sympathetic court that the cam-
eras had "absolutely no adverse effect upon the participants' per-
formance or the decorum of the proceedings. 3
27. 99 S. Ct. at 2929-30. "The trial is always public; . .. [Tihere seems to have been
an undue solicitude to introduce into the constitution some of the general guards and proceed-
ings of the common law in criminal trials ... " 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1785 (Boston 1833).
28. 99 S. Ct. at 2931 n.10.
29. See In re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
Ironically, the Florida Supreme Court determined, after several years of study, that the
camera scheme was workable only if the consent of trial participants was not required. Id. at
766; cf. 99 S. Ct. at 2908 ("our adversary system of criminal justice is premised upon the
proposition that the public interest is fully protected by the participants in the litigation").
30. FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(7) specifically prohibited
"broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs" in and around courtrooms except
for ceremonial, instructional and other limited purposes.
31. 370 So. 2d at 766; see petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 347 So. 2d 402
(Fla. 1977); Whisenand, Florida's Experience with Cameras in the Courtroom, 64 A.B.A.J.
1860 (1978).
32. 370 So. 2d at 767.
33. Id. at 768.
34. Id. at 768-69. The percentages of each group which responded to the survey were as
follows:
Witness 44%
Attorney 65%
Court Personnel 72%
Juror 65%
Id. at 768.
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Survey respondents indicated that although the presence of cam-
eras made participants slightly self-conscious and nervous, it also
made them more attentive and responsible. Court personnel and
attorneys surveyed felt that participating attorneys were slightly
more flamboyant than usual, but that witnesses were affected "to
a degree between not at all and slightly. '35
A second, separate study, conducted by the Conference of Circuit
Judges, elicited a somewhat smaller response than did the OSCA
poll.36 However, ninety to ninety-five percent of the circuit judges
who commented felt that trial participants "were not affected in the
performance of their sworn duty by the presence of electronic
media."37
In finally acceding to petitioner's request to amend Canon 3A(7)
of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, the court made it clear that
it was doing so on the basis of its supervisory authority, "not upon
any constitutional imperative." 38 Nevertheless, the opinion quite
clearly recognized Florida's "commitment to open government" as
a compelling impetus to opening the state's courtroom doors to the
camera. 9 The court quoted Nixon v. Warner Communications" to
reject the notion that the first and sixth amendments mandate elec-
tronic media access to judicial proceedings; yet, in the same deci-
sion the court saw a recognition by the United States Supreme
Court that the public has a right to attend trials.' The court further
observed that: "It is essential that the populace have confidence in
the [judicial] process, for public acceptance of judicial judgments
and decisions is manifestly necessary to their observance.''42
Despite the Florida court's outward disavowal of predicating its
decision "[on] any constitutional imperative," 3 its Post-Newsweek
35. Id. at 769.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 770.
38. Id. at 774. Canon 3A(7) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct now reads:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct
of proceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and
(iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending cause, electronic media
and still photography coverage of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and
trial courts of this state shall be allowed in accordance with standards of conduct
and technology promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida.
39. Id. at 780. The Florida Legislature opened its chambers to gavel-to-gavel television
coverage in 1973, becoming the first legislative body in the country to take its full delibera-
tions into constituents' homes. See also FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(a), (b) (requiring full and
public financial disclosure by public officials and candidates); FLA. STAT. ch. 119 (1977)
(public records law); FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1977) (open meetings law).
40. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
41. 370 So. 2d at 774.
42. Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 774.
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opinion is anchored firmly in state judicial precedents which speak
openly of safeguarding first and sixth amendment access rights.44
Other states'5 and lower federal courts" appear to share Florida's
concern for encouraging public awareness and observation of their
respective judicial systems. The decisions which demonstrate that
concern invariably refer to the roots of open judicial proceedings as
imbedded deep in Anglo-Saxon common law. 7
The tradition of public participation unquestionably predates the
formulation of fundamental rights for the accused as now embodied
in the sixth amendment.'" The writings of sixteenth and seventeenth
century commentators suggest that England's courts were opened
as a direct reaction to and distrust of the secret proceedings held on
the Continent and by English ecclesiastical courts. 9
Early American colonists incorporated the tradition of public at-
tendance at both civil and criminal trials into their charters and
constitutions. A strong desire to ensure and perpetuate public par-
ticipation in judicial proceedings, even to the exclusion of a profes-
sional legal structure, manifested itself in forceful declarations.5'
44. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977); News-Press
Publishing Co. v. State, 345 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100;
State ex rel Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
overruled on other grounds sub nom. English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
45. E.g., Gannett Pacific Corp. v. Richardson, 580 P.2d 49 (Hawaii 1978) (sufficient basis
required for closure of pretrial hearing); Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Anderson, 259
N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1977) (clear and substantial showing of prejudice required); Keene Pub-
lishing Corp. v. Keene Dist. Court, 380 A.2d 261 (N.H. 1977) (pretrial closure not justifiable
on basis of protecting accused's rights); State v. Allen, 373 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1977) (public has
right to expect public trials); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 387 A.2d 425 (Pa.
1978) (public access should be limited only when compelling state obligation exists to protect
accused's right to fair trial); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322 (Wyo. 1979) (presumption of
open proceedings absent exceptional circumstances); see 99 S. Ct. at 2931 n.10.
46. E.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978) (public has common law
right to open proceedings); Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanamid Co., 506 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1974) (only limited portions of a trial may be closed, and then only under exceptional
circumstances); United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973) (right to public access
attaches at pretrial stage); Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1965) (sixth amendment
public trial guarantee protects the public's right to know as much as the accused's right to
fair trial).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 2925-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2927.
49. See 1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 594-95, 603 (London 1827). See
also, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 n.21 (1948).
50. See F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 18,
22 (1969); 1 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 49-53 (1909).
51. East Jersey and the Carolinas actually prohibited the payment of money for legal
representation. F. HELLER, supra note 50, at 17-19.
[Wihen the continental Congress declared "that the respective colonies are enti-
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In 1787 a debate arose among the framers of the Constitution over
the necessity of enumerating fundamental rights to be retained by
the people." The fierce exchanges and speeches, which led to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, clearly demonstrate the concern the
founders of the new republic had that the people retain traditional
common law rights.5 That concern was manifested further by the
inclusion of the ninth amendment: "The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
Prior to DePasquale, the United States Supreme Court cited this
Anglo-American and colonial history in dictum to support Justice
Blackmun's current dissenting conclusion: that the sixth and four-
teenth amendments prohibit "the States from excluding the public
from a proceeding. . . without affording full and fair consideration
to the public's interests in maintaining an open proceeding. 5 5 In In
re Oliver the Court denounced as unconstitutional the Michigan
practice of allowing a judge to act as a one-person grand jury.5" In
so holding, the Court recognized that the purpose of public criminal
trials is to act as a "restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." 57
The Supreme Court frequently has reiterated the concept of utiliz-
ing public awareness as a safeguard against unchecked judicial au-
tonomy."
tled to the common law ... " the common law so appealed to must be understood
to include not only trial by a jury. . . but also publicity of the proceedings ...
The denial of these rights was among the grievances complained of in the Declara-
tion of Independence.
Id. at 21 (quoting Declaration of Rights of the Continental Congress art. 5 (1774), reprinted
in H.R. Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong. 1st Ses. 3 (C. Tansill ed. 1927)).
52. James Wilson expressed grave doubts about the necessity for enacting a Bill of Rights
at the Pennsylvania Convention on Nov. 28, 1787:
[A] bill of rights is neither an essential nor a necessary instrument . . . for who
will be bold enough to undertake to enumerate all the rights of the people?...
[Ilf the enumeration is not complete, everything not expressly mentioned will be
presumed to be purposely omitted.
3 RECORDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 143-44 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). See also 3 J.
STORY, supra note 27, at § 1776.
53. See 2 RECORDS OF FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 637 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See 3 J. STORY, supra note 27, at §§ 1898-1901.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2932-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
57. Id. at 270. The Court also interpreted Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928) as
standing for the proposition that a criminal trial conducted in secret is a violation of due
process. Id. at 272.
58. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint order uncon-
stitutional when other alternatives available to trial court). "[Dliscussion of public affairs
in a free society cannot depend on the preliminary grace of judicial censors." Id. at 573
(Brennan, J., concurring).
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (publication of infor-
mation regarding confidential commission investigating judge cannot be criminally punisha-
1979]
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The Court now appears to be reversing its prior, suggested posi-
tion on the access question." As the Florida Supreme Court sug-
gested in Post-Newsweek the public access issue has no clearly
defined constitutional basis; it, in effect, straddles the first and
sixth amendments. 0 In his concurring opinion in DePasquale, Jus-
tice Powell apparently recognized this dual constitutional nature of
the public's right to courtroom access.6' He pointedly rejected Jus-
tice Rehnquist's conclusion that the Court's opinion leaves trial
courts "free to determine for themselves the question whether to
open or close the proceeding.""2 Yet Justice Powell turned away
from the sixth amendment basis advocated by the dissent and pred-
icated his defense of open proceedings on the first and fourteenth
amendments. 3 He thereby reserved to himself the burden of being
the probable decisive vote in the next public access case the Court
decides to review-a role Justice Rehnquist viewed with some dis-
dain.e1
Because Justice Powell chose a different constitutional basis for
his defense of open courtrooms, Florida's "cameras in the court-
room" experiment arguably lacks the blessing of the country's high-
est court. Had its 5-4 vote followed Justice Blackmun's reasoning,
DePasquale would be a clear affirmation of the Florida court's senti-
ment: "We have no need to hide our bench and bar under a
bushel." 5
Although Justice Powell based his support of open trials on the
first amendment, he failed to discuss the fact that the media's first
amendment right of access has been tied increasingly to that of the
public. 6 Justice Powell addressed the delicate press and public ac-
ble under first amendment), Chief Justice Burger wrote: "The operations of the courts and
the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern." Id. at 839.
59. 99 S. Ct. at 2911.
60. Compare 99 S. Ct. at 2915-16 (Powell, J., concurring) with id. at 2932-33 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). See also Opinion & Comment, 65 A.B.A.J. 1264 (1979).
61. 99 S. Ct. at 2918-19.
62. Id. at 2919 n.2. Justice Powell challenged that conclusion. Id. at 2915 n.2.
63. "1 would hold explicitly that petitioner's reporter had an interest protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments in being present at the pretrial suppression hearing." Id.
at 2914.
64. "I do not so lightly as my Brother Powell impute to the four dissenters in this case a
willingness to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis and to join with him in some later decision
to form what might fairly be called an 'odd quintuplet'. Id. at 2919 n.2 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
65. 370 So. 2d at 781.
66. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (once a public hearing is held,
nothing can keep the press from reporting what occurs there); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 684-85 (1972) ("Newsmen have no constitutional right of access. . . when the general
public is excluded."); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966) ("there is nothing
that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom"); Estes v.
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cess/fair trial balance required by past United States Supreme
Court decisions by suggesting that the press and public have the
burden of "showing to the [trial] court's satisfaction that alterna-
tive procedures [to closure] are available ... ."6 In the past, that
burden has lain with the parties and the court. Thus, even Justice
Powell's maverick first amendment stance appears to meet only
halfway the stringent standards imposed in the past 8 to ensure the
delicate press and public access/fair trial balance which has evolved
through years of Supreme Court decisions. That very concept of
carefully weighing constitutional rights may be hopelessly obsolete
in the light of DePasquale: "[A] trial judge may surely take protec-
tive measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably nec-
essary.""'
DePasquale already has begun to impact heavily on the public
and the press. At least some trial courts have interpreted it to allow
the closure of trials to exclude everyone from the courtroom except
trial participants.70 Thus, not only the public, but the press-and
Florida's cameras-can be banned. It is sadly ironic, in this era of
legislative sunshine laws and administrative hearing acts, that the
nation's highest court has relegated a time-honored and cherished
right of the people to the status of merely "a strong societal inter-
est."'
The DePasquale plurality overlooked the significant question of
whether the accused's guarantee of a "public trial" can be meaning-
ful without the "public." The promise of increased courtroom ac-
cess, held out to the citizens of Florida by the state's highest court,
rings hollow in the wake of DePasquale.7 2
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Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965) (reporters entitled to same courtroom access rights as general
public).
67. 99 S. Ct. at 2916. "The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights .. " Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976); see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
68. See generally Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947) ("imminent, not merely a
likely, threat to the administration of justice"); United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102,
106 (5th Cir. 1974) ("limitation can be no broader than necessary to accomplish the desired
goal"); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 908 (Fla. 1977) ("danger
... must immediately imperil").
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2904.
70. See TIME, Aug. 20, 1979, at 49; Epstein, Closing of trials traced to Supreme Court
Ruling, Tallahassee Democrat, Aug. 19, 1979, at 8A, col. 2. See also Tribe, Trying California's
Judges on Television: Open Government or Judicial Intimidation? 65 A.B.A.J. at 1179 (1979).
71. 99 S. Ct. at 2907.
72. "[Tlhis Court emphatically has rejected the proposition . . . that the First Amend-
ment is some sort of Constitutional 'sunshine law' . . . ." 99 S. Ct. at 2918 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). See Opinion & Comment, 65 A.B.A.J. 1264 (1979).
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